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1 Introduction 
Economists, economic historians and economic geographers (among others) have for long been 
interested in the concept of “technological catch-up” as it refers to the ability of some formerly less 
developed countries to catch-up to the world leaders in economic terms (e.g. Abramovitz 1986; 
Gerschenkron 1962). Due to its complexity, the literature on catching-up has evolved in recent 
decades towards systemic approaches (Fagerberg and Srholec 2008). An important reference point in 
the contemporary debate on technological catch-up is, thus, the abundant literature (for a review see 
Fagerberg and Sapprasert [2011]) on “national innovation systems” (NISs). The reasoning behind 
this recent interest on NIS capabilities and technological catch-up has been aptly summarized by 
Castellacci and Archibugi (2008, 1670):  
 
“In a Schumpeterian perspective, innovative capabilities constitute a key engine of growth, and an 
important source of cumulativeness in the dynamics of economic systems. A greater innovation gap 
today is likely to lead to a greater income gap tomorrow. The interaction between technological and 
economic factors would thus possibly drive the countries further and further apart and such a Myrdalian 
cumulative causation could therefore lead to greater disparities in the years ahead”.  
 
However, only a few systematic empirical accounts in terms of technological catch-up vis-à-vis NISs 
exist. This gap is addressed here through an analysis of the different dimension of NISs, namely 
innovation and technological capabilities, human capital, infrastructures, economic competitiveness, 
political-institutional factors, and social capital with indicators from the CANA database (covering a 
time period from 1980 to 2008). 
In conceptual terms there is a distinction to be made between catch-up and the more wide scale 
phenomenon of convergence: whereas catch-up, not to be confused with exact copying (Nelson 
2004), refers to the experienced narrowing of the gap (to the global leaders) by an individual country, 
 
 
convergence relates to a situation where global overall differences would be shrinking (Fagerberg 
and Godinho 2004). However, it seems that this kind of global convergence is highly unlikely and, 
rather, at best one can describe a number of converging groups (or clubs) of countries (Castellacci 
and Archibugi 2008). This dichotomy acts as the motivation behind this paper: the issue of global 
convergence in the technological capabilities of countries is examined through different dimensions 
of NISs to investigate 1) whether or not there is evidence on the existence of contemporary global 
convergence in NIS capabilities, 2) whether one can designate clear groupings of converging 
(catching-up) countries, and 3) how do these results relate to economic development? 
 
2 National innovation systems: Definition, dimensions and technological catch-up 
2.1 Varying definitions of national innovation systems 
Since the early works on NISs by Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992), and Nelson (1993) the concept 
has evolved to encompass a number of varying definitions and has spurred a diversity of related 
concepts, such as regional, sectoral, and technological innovation systems. As a common nominator 
the varying definitions consider innovation through a systemic approach with feed-back loops rather 
than as a linear process. Similarly, in NIS definitions the importance of other actors than strictly firms 
engaged in innovative activities are stressed and brought to the fore when discussing the innovative 
capabilities and performances of nations. 
Already in the 1980s, Perez (1983) discussed on a national level how structural changes and the 
assimilation of technological innovations are driven through two distinct groups (namely the “socio-
institutional” and “techno-economic” sub-systems) of characteristics. Accordingly, the concept of 
NISs can be defined in a narrow (the main sources of innovation, i.e. those institutions that are 
deliberately promoting the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge) and broad (a wider socio-
economic system including political and cultural determinants) sense (Freeman 2002; Lundvall 
 
 
1992). As stated by Lundvall (2011) narrow definitions of NISs are of limited relevance when it 
comes to the NISs of the less developed economies due to their modest innovative output (which does 
not necessarily coincide with contemporary and future potential for innovation). Thus, here the broad 
definition of NISs was adopted as the framework for the empirical investigation. At the same time, 
however, when considering NISs according to the broad definition, the empirical measurement of 
NISs becomes highly problematic, since the complexity of the approach renders quantitative analysis 
challenging (Katz 2006). Castellacci and Natera (2011) have proposed a division of six distinct 
dimensions to be considered when threating NISs empirically: 1) innovation and technological 
capabilities, 2) education system and human capital, 3) infrastructures, 4) economic competitiveness, 
5) political-institutional factors, and 6) social capital. Thus, to guide the data gathering processes (and 
further the empirical analysis) this division was also adopted here to describe the various dimensions 
of NISs in a broad sense. 
Finally, it has to be noted that the NISs approach has also raised several critical questions on its 
applicability and suitability for empirical studies as well as for policy-making (Raunio and Kautonen 
2014). Notably, Miettinen (2002) has criticized the employment of the approach as a policy tool, 
Carlsson et al. (2002) have discussed the problems related to the delineation of innovation systems, 
since NISs do not develop in isolation but are influenced by other countries and their NISs (Davenport 
and Bibby 1999), and for example Intarakumnerd, Chairatana, and Tangchitpiboon (2002) have 
pinpointed some complications inherent in adopting such an approach in the context of developing 
countries. Additionally, the difficulties related to the empirical validation of the concept and cross-
country comparisons of NISs have been discussed in a range of studies (e.g. Balzat and Hanusch 
2004; Guan and Chen 2012). However, despite this well-placed criticism the NISs approach can be 
considered as a valuable analytical tool for examining the issues of innovation and technological 
 
 
capabilities and catch-up due to its systemic nature that includes various “softer” dimensions, besides 
strict measures for innovation inputs and outputs, also relevant for economic development. 
 
2.2 Dimensions of the broad definition of national innovation systems 
A major factor in determining the innovative performance of a given country is the level and 
condition of its innovation and technological capabilities. These issues relate to the measurable items 
of research and development (R&D) expenditure and personnel, scientific quality in terms of numbers 
of research articles, royalty and license fees as well as to patents. For example, the results of Furman 
and Hayes (2004, 1350) suggest that “continuously increasing investments in innovation is, 
ultimately, essential for achieving innovative leadership”. However, innovation and technologic 
capabilities are essential but not sufficient to gather for the different aspects of innovation systems 
necessary for sustained innovation development. Rather, the NISs also need a certain degree of 
absorptive capacity for imitation-based technological development and catch-up (Castellacci and 
Natera 2013). 
Thus, other dimensions besides innovation and technological capabilities are needed to explain the 
innovative performance of nations. One such dimension with almost a universal agreement on its 
positive impact for innovation is that of human capital (and education system). At the national level 
human capital is commonly proxied through various indicators depicting the official educational 
attainment levels of its population and other schooling related measures such as educational 
expenditures and teacher-pupil ratios (Gennaioli et al. 2013; Teixeira and Fortuna 2010). As stated 
above, empirical works have indeed corroborated the positive impacts of human capital (or 
educational attainment) on nations’ innovative capabilities and performance (Makkonen and Inkinen 
2013; Teles and Joiozo 2011). In fact, human capital can be seen as a major factor for countries in 
 
 
developing their NISs from a purely imitation-based phase towards a more developed innovation 
stage (Castellacci and Natera 2013). 
Additionally, the quality of national infrastructures also matter. The dimension is commonly 
associated with indicators related to the knowledge transfer and diffusion aspects of NISs, including 
the numbers of Internet users and telephone subscribers (Baskaran and Muchie 2006) as well as the 
volume of cross-country transportation and the quality of national transport infrastructure also highly 
important for innovations (Ridley, Yee-Cheung, and Juma 2006). In particular, the importance of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) has been proven to play a significant role in the 
diffusion of knowledge across the globe, which is important for innovation creation as well as for the 
national absorptive capabilities in imitating and adopting innovations produced elsewhere 
(Castellacci and Natera 2013). This heightened importance of ICT, might turn out particularly 
problematic for developing countries, since according to empirical evidence, they seem to lack behind 
in the access to (and the ability to use) ICT (Hilbert 2010). 
In turn, the economic competitiveness of nations has a pivotal role in the development of NISs. 
However, in the sense of the economic competitiveness discussed here, other factors than strict 
growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) are taken into account as the dimension relates to the 
financial and legal aspects of NISs; in short, financial constraints significantly reduce the likelihood 
that firms have innovative activities (Savignac 2008). Thus, the importance of issues such as the time 
and cost of enforcing contracts, the availability of credits from the banking sector, and the importance 
of an open, free, and well-functioning financial system for the NIS development is evident 
(Castellacci and Natera 2011; Kim 2000). 
In line, political and institutional factors are highly significant for vibrant NISs and technological 
catch-up (Mudombi and Muchie 2014; Pinto and Santos Pereira 2013). Therefore, countries with 
basic (democratic) freedoms (such as freedom of speech and press, political rights, etc.), low levels 
 
 
of corruption and institutions supportive towards innovation seem to do well in global NIS 
comparisons (Makkonen 2014), since political-institutional processes, stability, and arrangements 
play a crucial role in the competitive performance of firms at the sectoral and national levels (Kim 
1998). For example, political instability exerts a strong (negative) influence on innovation inputs in 
NISs (Allard, Martinez, and Williams 2012) and efforts to foster innovations within an economy will 
be more productive if accompanied by policy reforms aimed at controlling corruption (Anokhin and 
Schulze 2009). 
The last, but equally important, dimension of NISs covers the aspect of social capital. Social capital 
has been deemed as highly important for innovation creation in regional and national scales (Doh and 
Acs 2010; Kallio, Harmaakorpi, and Pihkala 2010) through its significance in forming trustworthy 
milieus for innovation cooperation (Kaasa 2009). However, the concept is both; fluid in its description 
(since there is no universally agreed definition of social capital) as well as hard to measure and 
validate (Tura and Harmaakorpi 2005). This renders any empirical treatment of the dimension as 
extremely difficult and subject to debate. Here, the concept is understood through the works of 
Putnam (2000) as the features of social organization (including networks, norms, and trust) that 
facilitate cooperation for mutual benefits. Accordingly, commonly utilized empirical proxies for 
social capital include measures related to mutual trust, associational activities and membership, 
importance of social ties, social equality (or inequality) as well as civic norms (Castellacci and Natera 
2011; Doh and Acs 2010). 
 
2.3 Earlier empirical studies on technological catch-up 
The existing empirical evidence on technological catch-up seems to be rather inconsistent. For 
example, Furman and Hayes (2004) observed that the gap between the most and the least innovative 
countries (in terms of relative innovation productivity) had diminished during the twenty years’ time-
 
 
period they investigated. The gap still remained, but it was relatively smaller in 1999 than in the 
beginning of their observation period in 1978. Similarly, the list of countries to introduce innovations 
truly new-to-the-world had widened to include a number of former imitator countries. Contrary, 
Castellacci and Archibugi (2008) have presented evidence that whereas what they have termed as the 
“followers club” has come closer to the technological frontier, the marginalized group of countries 
has, in fact, experienced a widening gap in innovative capabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
Accordingly, Kemeny (2011) has shown that a large technology gap separates the most and the least 
sophisticated economies in the world. Moreover, according to his data and observation period from 
1972 to 2001 this gap has been growing: the development of technological sophistication of 
economies was characterized by stagnation of countries at the bottom of the spectrum, moderate 
technological upgrading in the middle and rapid expansion of technology levels at the top.  
When it comes to distinct country groupings it seems that for example the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) as well as the new EU-member countries of the East and Central 
Europe seem to have been able to catch-up to the world leaders in innovation (Altenburg, Schmitz, 
and Stamm 2008; Makkonen 2014). As pointed out in the introduction this, however, does not 
necessarily indicate that global convergence would be under way. Moreover, from a methodological 
point of view, recent studies on technological catch-up have noted that relying on a single metric 
related to world frontier innovation activities (such as the European Innovation Scoreboard) omits a 
number of important NIS factors (according to the broad definition) for follower countries and, hence, 
is inadequate for analysis concerning economies behind the technology frontier (Kravtsova and 
Radosevic 2012).  
In sum, it seems that the evidence whether the gap between the most innovative and least 
innovative countries has indeed been diminishing over the last few decades is inconclusive. What is 
clearer is that at least some countries have been able to catch-up to the world leaders in innovation. 
 
 
Moreover, whether or not countries have been able to catch-up seems to depend much on their ability 
to develop their NISs (Fagerberg and Verspagen 2007). However, the existing studies do not 
convincingly indicate (or rather have not discussed the issue) global convergence in terms of the 
different dimensions of the broad definition of NISs since they 1) have more often focused on a 
restricted group of rich countries frequently neglecting the developing world and 2) have mainly 
focused on the innovative performance (narrow definition) of nations leaving aside the (broad 
definition) different dimensions of NISs (Castellacci and Archibugi 2008). 
 
3 Data and methods 
The data used here was gathered from the CANA database, which as stated by its constructors 
“provides full information for the whole set of country-year observations, i.e. it contains no missing 
values” (Castellacci and Natera 2013, 583). The database is comprised of 41 indicators (34 with full 
country coverage and seven for a smaller sample of countries) from the NIS related dimensions 
discussed above for 134 countries for a time period of 1980–2008. A thorough methodological 
description and statistical validation of the database can be found in Catellacci and Natera (2011). 
Suffice to say here, that the original missing values in the data (gathered from existing cross-country 
data sources of the World Bank, UNESCO, etc.) have been replaced with the best available estimates 
(calculated through the method of “multiple imputation”) and that the database has an impressive 
array of variables compared to other available global databases (e.g. the ARCO database by 
Archigbugi and Coco [2004]). The indicators utilized here are presented in Table 1. The issue of 
convergence is discussed through standard descriptive statistics (quintiles and range) to produce a 
coherent picture whether or not the differences between the extremes (the highest and the lowest 
values) in NIS capabilities have been diminishing or widening between 1980 and 2008. 
 
 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
In terms of identifying the convergence clubs the method utilized here is that of principal component 
analysis (PCA). In short, PCA is a commonly applied method for constructing composite indexes i.e. 
when pursuing to compress the information present in several measures into one (or a few) principal 
components (PC) expressing the dimension under scrutiny (Jolliffe 2002). In PCA it is presupposed 
that there are statistically significant correlations between the variables included in the analysis. 
Therefore, the measures used in this study for PCA suitability are the Bartlett test of sphericity testing 
whether the values of the correlation matrix equals to zero and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
testing whether the partial correlation among variables is sufficiently high. The analyses conducted 
here passed these “suitability” tests. 
The index scores, i.e. principal component scores (PCS), for individual countries are calculated in 
a way similar to regression analysis by weights determined on the basis of the analysis. Changes in 
PCS will reflect both the importance (loadings) of the various indicators included in the PC over time 
and shifts in countries’ positions relative to each other (Fagerberg, Srholec, and Knell 2007). These 
PCS are standardized to a mean of zero, whereas the standard deviation of the distribution of PCS 
equals to one (DiStefano, Zhu, and Mîndrilâ 2009). By adopting the methodology used by Filippetti 
and Peyrache (2011) we can then define a Relative PCS Index (RPI) to describe the ratio between the 
PCS of a given observation unit i.e. country (k) at a period of time (t) in relation to the best performing 
country (Equation 1; bounded between one and zero): 
 
𝑅𝑃𝐼𝑘
𝑡 =
𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑘
𝑡
𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑡 . 
(1) 
 
 
 
Thus, by repeating the analysis for every year one will be in a position to detect any clear groupings 
of convergence countries that (might) have been steadily increasing their capabilities in terms of NISs. 
The advantage here, when compared to composite indexes with fixed weights, is that the changes in 
the relative importance of the indicators included in the analysis is also taken into account. Thus, high 
performance in an indicator of a given country that has lost its explanatory power during the time 
period analysed does not lead to overestimations of the contemporary position of that country in the 
global ranking. Here the number of countries included was maximized, a direction highlighted by 
Filippetti and Peyrache (2011) as an important avenue for research, by excluding the variables of the 
CANA-database that did not have a full country coverage out of the PCA to address the phenomena 
of global convergence and catch-up with a wider set of countries (see Table 1). 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Global convergence? 
When investigating the different dimensions of NISs (the index year was set to the start of the 
observation period: 1980) of the range between the minimum and maximum quintile cut off points, 
i.e. the gap between the best and the weakest performing countries in each indicator, it becomes 
obvious that a large scale global convergence is not underway (Figure 1). In the dimension of 
innovation and technological capabilities the gap has widened in every measured indicator. For 
royalty payments, patents, and R&D the widening of the gap is marked, but for scientific articles the 
divergent development paths have led to a staggering difference between the minimum and maximum 
quintiles, which was over four times higher in 2008 to what it was in 1980. When it comes to the 
dimension of human capital and education system; the evidence points towards widening gaps in 
terms of tertiary education as well as teacher-student ratios. The steep rise in the gap of tertiary 
education is in particular worrying for global convergence. However, as a distinct positive 
 
 
development the differences in primary and secondary education, mean-years-of-schooling, and 
public expenditure on education have narrowed down (a bit) during the observation period.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Contrary, in terms of the national infrastructures the situation seems bleak for global convergence. 
Whereas, the gap in indicators measuring paved roads has remained relatively stable, the gap has 
widened to that of the situation in 1980 in all the rest of the indicators. Access to the Internet, 
telephone subscribers, telecommunications revenue, departures of air carriers, and consumption of 
electricity point toward growing gaps of differing possibilities, where the developed nations enjoy 
positive growth patterns and the developing countries lag more and more behind. This is particularly 
evident in the case of access to the Internet, where in a short observation period the gap has widened 
thirty-six-fold in 2008 to that of the commercialization of the Internet in 1995. In the dimension of 
economic competiveness the situation has remained more or less unchanged, except for finance 
freedom where the gap has indeed narrowed down. In the other indicators, the gap has not widened, 
nor has it narrowed to a significant degree although fluctuating from year-to-year around the index 
score of one hundred and turning to a negative development, in terms of global convergence, in the 
very last years of the observation period.  
However, as in the case of human capital, some positive signs can be found in the dimensions of 
political-institutional factors and social capital. The observed gaps in corruption, press freedoms, and 
Gini-coefficient were smaller in 2008 than in the start of the observation period. This development 
is, however, unstable as the range between the minimum and maximum quintiles seem to fluctuate 
heavily on a year-to-year basis. In the other measures of political and institutional factors and social 
capital (based on subjective indexes), the year-to-year changes in the range between the minimum 
 
 
and maximum values were arbitrary and, thus, omitted from Figure 1. To conclude: there are only 
weak signs of global convergence in some of the measures applied here in the dimensions of human 
and social capital as well as in political-institutional factors. As a whole, the country-wise differences 
in NIS capabilities, according to the individual indicators measured, seem to have either remained 
more or less the same or rather taken a turn towards growing differences between the best and the 
weakest performing countries. 
 
4.2 Convergence clubs 
A certain amount of catch-up can be detected from Figure 2: most countries in the lower end of 
the spectrum in 1980 seem to have grown the fastest when measured in PCS. Additionally, the 
statistically (highly) significant correlation coefficient of -0.307 between the (unbounded) PCS in 
1980 and the experienced change (1980–2008) signal a presence of moderate convergence (cf. 
Filippetti and Peyrache 2011). However, the results still do not point towards a clear global 
convergence, due to the standardized nature of PCS. Furthermore, the countries at the top and bottom 
positions in the index have remained more or less the same (Appendix 1). Thus, in the following we 
are interested on the set of countries that have been able to steadily improve their capabilities in a 
balanced way. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
When arranged according to the RPI scores and corresponding NIS rankings the countries form a 
clear cluster structure (Appendix 1). According to a hierarchical cluster analysis the two most obvious 
clusters (altogether four clusters plus one outlier, Gambia, were identified; including more clusters 
into the analysis did not change this initial solution to a significant degree) are formed for the leading 
 
 
countries (cluster number four) in the ranking and for the weakest performing countries (cluster 
number two). A third cluster (cluster number one) was formed from countries with mediocre RPI 
scores and NIS rankings. The interest here, however, lies in the countries that have been able to 
significantly improve their NIS capabilities: a clear group of converging countries was identified 
(Figure 3). This group (cluster number three) includes the Eastern European countries of Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the Latin American 
countries of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Uruguay together with South 
Africa, South Korea, and (quite surprisingly) Mongolia. These countries have been able to steadily 
improve their capabilities in terms of the broader definition of NISs and now occupy positions right 
after the best performing countries. There are also other countries (for example Albania, Benin, 
Lesotho, Mali, and Oman) that have been able to catch-up significantly, but, however, were not 
identified as a part of the convergence cluster due to their lower RPI scores. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
Accordingly, there are a number of countries that have lost their standings in the NIS rankings. These 
countries include some of the less developed countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, but 
surprisingly also the BRICS countries of China, India, and Russia (Appendix 1). It thus seems that, 
despite the earlier empirical evidence showing growth in terms of “hard” measures for innovation, 
China, India, and Russia did actually worse in 2008 than in 1980 when various “softer” political-
institutional factors are included into the analysis. This might not do justice to the countries in terms 
of their innovation output, but, however, still raises questions concerning the broader social 
sustainability of their reported growth and development.  
 
 
 
4.3 Implications for economic development 
The discussion on NIS capabilities relate to their ability to produce innovations further transformed 
into economic development. By taking account the broader definition of NISs the paper has been able 
to raise some interesting points. First, the inclusion of a multitude of “soft” factors into the analysis 
does not change the composition of the top performing countries to a significant degree: the countries 
performing well here are the commonly identified innovation leaders of Nordic Countries together 
with the most developed nations of Europe and Northern America plus Japan. Second, however, many 
of the previously identified converging countries, when considering only hard factors of innovation, 
including some of the BRICS-countries (China, India, and Russia) have in fact lost their positions 
during the time period analysed here (Appendix 1), when compared through the lens of the broader 
definition of NISs. This leads to an important question: does the broader definition of NISs then have 
any relevance in terms of economic development of nations? When considering the global rankings 
in both NIS capabilities and GDP per capita in current US$ (collected from the database of the World 
Bank) it seems evident that there is a positive association between economic development levels and 
performance in the NIS rankings (Figure 4). The statistically highly significant correlation 
coefficients of 0.756 for 1990 and 0.809 for 2008 corroborate this view.  
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
However, there is no evident causality between changes from one ranking to another across the whole 
country set included: an improvement in one ranking does not automatically lead to an improvement 
in the other (Figure 5), not even for the countries that have been catching-up the most (i.e. the 
convergence club). Still one can see a definite correlation (0.249; p-level = 0.004) between the 
changes in the NIS and economic development rankings: countries that have improved their 
 
 
performance in the NIS rankings are commonly those that have grown, in terms of GDP, the fastest. 
For example, when taking a closer look at the 17 countries of the group identified (Figure 3) as the 
convergence cluster, eleven have improved their performance in both rankings and four have 
experienced a standstill or (only) a modest drop in their standings in the GDP rankings. However, 
Argentina and South Africa, whose standings in the GDP rankings have plummeted despite the 
improvements in their standings in the NIS rankings, stand out as clear exceptions to this positive 
association. Accordingly, in the case of the other BRICS countries, whereas Brazil’s and Russia’s 
developments in both rankings are fairly similar (i.e. a standstill or a modest decline), India has 
improved its position in the GDP rankings despite its worsening standing in the NIS rankings. Finally, 
one of the most striking examples of the mismatch between the two rankings is offered by the case 
of China–a country that has done extremely well in enhancing its performance in terms of GDP 
irrespective of its less flattering RPI scores development. 
 
<Figure 5 about here> 
 
In sum, NIS dynamics and economic development are definitely intertwined. Countries doing well in 
economic terms also excel in the NIS rankings and those who have improved their NIS capabilities 
are also commonly those that have grown in economic terms. This, however, does not imply a direct 
causality between the two (as the examples from BRICS countries illustrate). A significant 
improvement in the NIS scores and rankings is not (in many cases) mirrored as such in economic 
growth even after a time lag. One possible explanation to the non-causality that arises from the 
empirical analysis might be the existence of different dynamics between the socio-institutional and 
techno-economic subsystems (dimensions) of NISs. As discussed already by Perez (1983) the socio-
institutional factors may change at a different (country-specific) pace from the techno-economic 
 
 
factors, hampering the applicability of results produced by static methodologies (even if they are 
repeated over the whole period), but also showing that in order to develop in economic terms (only), 
a country does not necessarily need to improve its capabilities in all of the dimensions of NISs (as 
shown for example by the case of China). However, the development of the dimensions of the broader 
definition of NISs employed here have to be also seen through the lens of wider socio-institutional 
and socio-economic change of a given country together with improvements in the standard of living 
and basic freedoms of its citizens deemed important for development for example by the United 
Nations in its declaration of human rights. 
 
5 Conclusions  
Here, the concept of technological catch-up was explored through the NISs framework by 
including a wide array of indicators form the CANA database (from the years 1980–2008) to produce 
a coherent picture on the dynamics of global convergence and or divergence vis-á-vis the varying 
dimension of the broader definition of NISs. The most important research results can be summarizes 
as follows. First, according to the results, despite some positive signs in the dimensions of human 
capital, political institutional factors and social capital, in general, the global differences are growing 
i.e. the gaps between the best and the weakest performers are widening. Second, the analysis was able 
to indicate a clear group or a club of converging countries, including, as expected, many Eastern 
European and Latin American countries together with South Africa, and South Korea (plus 
Mongolia), that have consistently been catching-up to the top performers in NIS capabilities. What 
was surprising, in the light of the earlier literature, was that when “softer” political-institutional 
factors are included into the analysis China, India, and Russia seem actually to do worse in 2008 than 
in 1980. Third, the comparisons between NIS and economic growth rankings were not able to produce 
conclusive evidence on the interconnections between them. At first glance it seems that the two are 
 
 
definitely associated with each other since the NIS and economic development rankings are highly 
correlated. Then again, a further inspection does not indicate causality between the two: an 
improvement in one of the rankings does not always lead to a subsequent improvement in the other 
even after a time lag. However, it is also stressed here that the NIS development should not be only 
viewed as a means of gaining economic growth, but also as a measure for the broader sustainable and 
inclusive socio-economic development of the countries.  
A definite policy implication of this study can therefore be found in an attempt to encourage 
countries to think beyond their economic growth rates when developing their respective NISs. NISs 
can be considered as more than merely the sum of innovation inputs and outputs and the following 
economic advancements. They can be viewed as the total value of the development in a given country 
including a broader set of “soft” dimensions such as basic political-institutional freedoms as well as 
the qualities of national infrastructures and educational system together with the “hard” measures of 
economic and innovative success. Striving to develop the economy in a way that takes into account 
both the “hard” and the “soft” factors ought to be universally embraced as a cornerstone to witch 
economic growth should be based on. With this it is also acknowledged that the western ways and 
ideals are not the only ones than have a change of success. Rather, future work could turn its attention 
to different descriptions of NISs, those that have not been drawn from the perspective of best 
performing benchmarks of western countries, but on the viewpoint of less successful development 
countries. The changes of duplicating the results from well-performing countries in all parts of the 
globe are slim. Thus, it is evident that there is a lot to learn from all spectrums of global players: those 
who are already doing well, those who are catching-up to the world leaders, and those who have 
stayed behind and marginalized. Not just showing with successful examples what should be done, 
but also discussing with less successful cases what has not worked, would benefit the contemporary 
discussion on global convergence and technological catch-up.  
 
 
Finally, it has to be noted that the discussion on the broader definition of NISs together with the 
chosen methodology is not without its limitations. First, the concept of NISs itself has received its 
fair share of criticism. However, as shown here the approach can serve its purpose as an analytical 
tool, when keeping in mind the varying problems related to its empirical treatment and validation. 
Second, it is acknowledged here that PCA is a rather descriptive method: while useful for exploring 
the data and in deriving a “big picture” further analysis with more sophisticated methodology are 
needed to analyse the issues brought forth here in a greater detail. For example, an interesting further 
step would be to test the efficiency of the NISs as in Zabala-Iturriagagoitia et al. (2007), to divide the 
dimensions of NISs into separate socio-institutional and techno-economic sub-systems (or pillars) as 
in Hanusch and Pyka (2007) or to check for the compositional effects of NISs as in Filippetti and 
Peyrache (2011) to get a better picture of the interconnectedness of the broader definition of NISs 
(and its various dimensions or sub-systems) and economic growth. Third, despite its usefulness the 
database utilized here has its limitations, as it has been compiled from many subjective evaluations 
(i.e. indicators based on expert opinions) and as it omits a number of important indicators, essential 
when discussing the innovative performance of nations. Thus, the inclusion of a wider set of objective 
measures of development and innovation input variables (such as R&D expenditures) for a wider set 
of countries could produce interesting further insights into the dynamics of NISs. 
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Appendix 1. NIS rankings 
 NIS Ranks Cluster  NIS Ranks Cluster 
  1980 2008 membership   1980 2008 membership 
Albania 106 53 1 Lebanon 39 67 1 
Algeria 122 101 2 Lesotho 110 80 2 
Angola 133 119 2 Liberia 94 86 2 
Argentina 80 42 3 Lithuania 53 27 3 
Armenia 64 71 1 Madagascar 104 91 1 
Australia 8 7 4 Malawi 112 105 2 
Austria 17 20 4 Malaysia 38 57 1 
Azerbaijan 56 104 1 Mali 116 78 2 
Bahrain 70 56 1 Mauritania 131 112 2 
Bangladesh 62 115 2 Mauritius 28 38 4 
Belgium 18 14 4 Mexico 41 64 1 
Benin 124 81 1 Moldova 86 66 1 
Bolivia 45 52 4 Mongolia 100 47 3 
Botswana 30 50 4 Morocco 77 95 1 
Brazil 44 44 4 Mozambique 134 107 2 
Bulgaria 63 41 1 Namibia 69 54 1 
Burkina Faso 58 94 2 Nepal 109 110 2 
Burundi 127 117 2 Netherlands 10 9 4 
Cambodia 129 109 2 New Zealand 5 6 4 
Cameroon 115 127 2 Nicaragua 103 69 3 
Canada 2 10 4 Niger 125 113 2 
Chad 130 132 2 Nigeria 37 111 2 
Chile 87 33 3 Norway 6 1 4 
China 95 125 2 Oman 117 83 2 
Colombia 35 63 1 Pakistan 128 121 2 
Costa Rica 21 34 4 Panama 42 39 4 
Cote d'Ivoire 101 116 2 Paraguay 76 65 1 
Croatia 96 36 3 Peru 54 48 1 
Czech Republic 66 23 3 Philippines 65 79 1 
Denmark 7 5 4 Poland 48 32 4 
Dominican Republic 27 55 4 Portugal 26 21 4 
Ecuador 32 70 1 Qatar 82 76 1 
Egypt 78 97 1 Romania 79 46 3 
El Salvador 99 51 3 Russia 57 87 1 
Estonia 52 18 3 Rwanda 114 122 2 
Ethiopia 126 130 2 Saudi Arabia 102 114 2 
Fiji 33 61 1 Senegal 46 88 1 
Finland 9 4 4 Sierra Leone 97 103 2 
France 15 19 4 Singapore 40 43 4 
Gabon 105 92 1 Slovakia 60 28 3 
Gambia 34 108 5 Slovenia 71 22 3 
Georgia 72 73 1 South Africa 75 45 3 
Germany 14 16 4 South Korea 81 24 3 
Ghana 43 59 1 Spain 22 17 4 
Greece 23 31 4 Sri Lanka 31 98 1 
Guatemala 61 72 1 Sudan 91 133 2 
Guinea 119 124 2 Swaziland 118 123 2 
Guyana 49 60 1 Sweden 3 2 4 
Haiti 111 93 2 Switzerland 4 13 4 
Honduras 92 68 3 Tajikistan 59 99 1 
Hungary 55 26 4 Tanzania 123 100 2 
Iceland 12 3 4 Thailand 47 75 1 
India 36 84 1 Togo 121 118 2 
Indonesia 83 82 1 Trinidad and Tobago 24 37 4 
 
 
Continued 
Iran 107 128 2 Tunisia 93 102 1 
Ireland 19 11 4 Turkey 50 58 1 
Israel 13 29 4 Uganda 108 106 2 
Italy 20 25 4 Ukraine 51 49 1 
Jamaica 29 40 4 United Kingdom 11 12 4 
Japan 16 15 4 United States 1 8 4 
Jordan 98 89 1 Uruguay 90 35 3 
Kazakhstan 74 85 1 Uzbekistan 89 129 2 
Kenya 85 96 2 Venezuela 25 77 1 
Kuwait 68 62 1 Vietnam 113 120 2 
Kyrgyzstan 67 74 1 Yemen 132 126 2 
Lao PDR 120 131 2 Zambia 88 90 1 
Latvia 84 30 3 Zimbabwe 73 134 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The indicators of the CANA-database (for a more detailed list and original data sources see 
Castellacci and Natera [2011]). 
  Countries 
Dimension / Indicator Short included in CANA 
Innovation and technological capabilities     
Royalty and license fees per capita Royalty 134 
US Patents granted per inhabitant Patents 134 
Scientific and technical journal articles per million inhabitants Articles 134 
R&D expenditure as % of GDP * R&D 94 
Education system and human capital     
Primary enrolment ratio Primary 134 
Secondary enrolment ratio Secondary 134 
Tertiary enrolment ratio Tertiary 134 
Mean years of schooling Schooling 134 
Public expenditure on education Public 134 
Primary pupil-teacher ratio Teacher 134 
Infrastructures     
Telecommunications revenue as % of GDP Telecom 134 
Electric power consumption Electric 134 
Internet users per 1 000 inhabitants (since 1995) Internet 134 
Fixed-line plus mobile telephone subscribers per 1000 inhabitants Telephone 134 
Paver roads as % of total roads Roads 134 
Departures of air carriers registered in the country per 1 000 inhabitants Departures 134 
Economic competitiveness     
Enforcing contracts: Time Enforce T 134 
Enforcing contracts: Cost Enforce C 134 
Domestic credit by banking sector as % of GDP Credit 134 
Finance freedom (assessment) Finance 134 
Openness indicator [(Import + Export)/GDP] Openness 134 
Political-institutional factors     
Corruption perception index Corruption 134 
Freedom of press index (print, broadcast, and internet freedom) Press I 134 
Freedom of press index (journalist freedom) Press II 134 
Extent of freedom of speech Speech 134 
Index of physical integrity and human rights Human R 134 
Index of women's rights Women's R 134 
Index of political rights Political R 134 
Civil liberties (basic freedoms) Liberties 134 
Extent of freedom of association Association 134 
Electoral self-determination (freedom of political choice) Self-D 134 
Index of democracy and autocracy Democracy 134 
Index of the intensity of armed conflicts  Conflicts 134 
Index of legislative electoral competitiveness Legislative 134 
Index of executive (branches in government) electoral competitiveness Executive 134 
Social capital *     
Importance of friends (index) Friends 80 
Importance of family (index) Family 80 
Importance of marriage (survey measure) Marriage 80 
Gini index Gini 80 
Social trust (survey measure) Trust 80 
Happiness (index) Happiness 80 
* Excluded from PCA   
 
 
 
 
Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. The relative change in the range (maximum-minimum quintile cut off points) of different 
dimensions and indicators of NIS (notice the varying scales; for Internet users the index year was 
set to 1995; N=134 countries, except N=94 for R&D and N=80 for Gini-coefficient).  
 
Figure 2. Convergence in the NIS capabilities in the observation period of 1980–2008 according to 
the unbounded principal component scores (N=134 countries). 
 
Figure 3. The convergence club as identified by hierarchical cluster analysis. 
 
Figure 4.  NIS and economic development (in terms of GDP per capita) rankings in 1990 and 2008. 
 
Figure 5.  The changes in NIS and economic development (in terms of GDP per capita) rankings 
1990–2008. 
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